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In the 1990s, reform swept through Latin America. Open markets replaced
closed economies. Real democracy replaced one-party rule and rigged elections.
For about half of the region's population, economic and political conditions improved-yet the gap between the rich and poor widened. The poor half received
little or no tangible benefits from these economic and democratic reforms. This
article argues that the most difficult and probably most important reform remains
to be accomplished: the reform of the legal and regulatory systems throughout
Latin America. Until that happens, dreams of first-world recognition and respectability will elude Latin nations.
INDUSTRIAL AND COMPETITION POLICIES
IN MEXICO

Eduardo Pgrez Motta

Until the 1980s, the Mexican economy was closed and strongly directed and
controlled by the central government. However, starting with the second half of
this decade and continuing into the 1990s, a marked change in industrial policy
sought to create conditions that would open the economy and foster competition
and economic efficiency. This process was undertaken by implementing a first gen-
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eration of reforms, which included policies designed to attain macroeconomic stability, trade openness, and a modernization of the regulatory framework. A
second generation of reforms included the application of horizontal instruments,
like standardization and metrology; the passing of new laws, such as the property
rights protection law and a law for foreign investments; and the creation of regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, unlike most countries undergoing this process, the
opening of the Mexican economy did not include the services sector, where distortions persisted. This article underscores competition problems that persist in certain regulated sectors, such as transport, telecommunications, energy, and
financial services. The article proposes specific measures to successfully tackle
such challenges, including: (1) providing autonomy to sectoral regulators to avoid
regulatory capture; (2) improving coordination between horizontal and vertical
regulators; and (3) promoting accountability of these regulators, particularly with
Congress and the judiciary. Finally, the author considers that laws can be perfected provided there is an adequate institutional framework. The reverse is not
true: well-written laws are useless when the institutions underlying them are
flawed.
LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION POLICY:
FROM NIRVANA ANTITRUST POLICY TO
REALITY-BASED INSTITUTIONAL
COMPETITION BUILDING

Ignacio De Le6n, Ph.D.

39

The inception of antitrust policy in Latin America is marred with misconceptions about the role of this policy. The seemingly pro-competitive goals declared
under the law collide with the pursuit of welfare efficiency goals that could impair
the natural outcomes of unfettered market forces. This article argues that the inherent contradiction between the stated goals of antitrust policy and its practical
effects ultimately rests on the lack of analytical relevance attached to the institutional milieu within which antitrust policy is to produce its effects. Institutional
connections are necessary to convey relevant information across the system; without these, the market would break down. The pursuit of imaginary optimality in
the allocation of resources drives antitrust enforcement; yet, its unattainable nature makes this goal meaningless as a policy yardstick. Worse still, it distorts the
economic need for institutional links between economic agents that, unavoidably,
policymakers take as manifestations of monopolistic behavior.

THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE, COMPETITION
POLICY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA

R. Shyam Khemani
and Ana Carrasco-Martin

The merits of fostering effective competition in the economy to encourage
economic efficiency, consumer welfare, productivity, innovation, and attract investment have been increasingly and widely recognized by governments around
the world. Relative to other regions, developing countries in Latin America have
been at the forefront in adopting pro-competition measures such as deregulating
industries, liberalizing trade and investment, and enacting competition (antitrust
or antimonopoly) laws. However, the quality of the investment climate that determines the risks and transaction costs associated with investing and operating a
business, as well as the implementation of competition law and policy, tend to vary
widely across Latin American countries. This article argues that to enhance
greater coherency and consistency in these policies, competition law-policy needs
to be integrated as a central platform. Doing so will improve and buttress the
investment climate prevailing in a country. To attain this requires increased efforts
to promote better understanding of the instruments, requirements, and benefits of
encouraging competition through "competition advocacy"-in government economic policy formulation, private sector business decisions, and civil society at
large.
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IMPLEMENTING COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Ana Maria Alvarez
and Pierre Horna

91

Despite all the bottlenecks faced in implementing competition law and policies (CLP) in Latin America, several countries have been able to organize competition regimes and establish effective competition agencies. Experience has shown
that the adage "no one size fits all" holds true; each country adheres to its own
agenda. Therefore, technical assistance (TA) entails a bottom-up progressive approach and reflects national priorities. At the outset of implementing a CLP in
developing countries, it is worth keeping in mind certain questions: Will the new
regulation represent an additional burden to the already-charged institutional setting, or will it be an additional rule capable of merging with the existing regulatory
agenda? Can countries sign agreements that include competition provisions if they
do not have a national law, and if the adoption of a competition law is conditioned
upon accepting a package of economic reforms? Does CLP represent a requirement under a cooperation agreement? Is it possible to promote the non-efficiency
goals of CLP, which include benefits for consumers and better living conditions for
the poor? Based on UNCTAD research and TA, this article draws on (1) an
UNCTAD program, Competencia Amdrica Latina (COMPAL), on strengthening
competition and consumer protection in Latin America; and (2) research on implementing competition provisions in regional trade agreements. This article addresses some policy conclusions in the context of successful implementation of a
CLP. It is imperative to continue advocacy programs to raise awareness among
policymakers, public officials, local businessmen, pro-consumers, NGOs, and citizens. A TA program to strengthen CLP should be based primarily on local priorities. Once the factors addressing local needs are cemented in place, regional
initiatives must be tackled. This depends heavily upon similarities between member countries and on the political will to cooperate.
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANTS AND
THE MUTATION EFFECT

Horacio Spector 129

This article is concerned with constitutional transplantation, that is, the borrowing of constitutional institutions and precedents from foreign jurisdictions. It
pursues two main goals. First, it argues that the borrowing of constitutional texts
can be successful over long periods of time, and that when the transplanted texts
fail, this failure is not easily attributable to transplantation alone. Second, it introduces the notion of a "mutation effect" to the theoretical analyses of judicial
transplants. By "mutation" of precedents, the author means the process of continuing to extend the scope of a holding, regardless of its factual basis, to cover situations not even contemplated in the reasoning that grounded the original decision.
The article discusses the mutation effect by using the doctrine of economic emergency, as invoked by the Argentine Supreme Court to justify the government's
expropriations of bank deposits.
This paper also examines two lines of economic research on legal transplantation. First, the so-called "LLSV paper" implies that developing countries should
transplant corporate and financial law from common law jurisdictions, because
this legal family affords stronger protection for investors (e.g., creditors and shareholders) than civil law. Second, the label "transplant effect" has been used to describe the ineffectiveness of legal transplants that result from insufficient local
demand for the transplanted law. By handling the notion of mutation effect the
article seeks to qualify the conclusions that could be drawn both from the LLSV
and the transplant-effect papers.

DOMESTIC BONDS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES, AND
THE NEXT TRANSFORMATION OF
SOVEREIGN DEBT

Anna Gelpern 147

Financial markets in poor and middle-income countries are experiencing a
fundamental shift. Until recently, most of them were shallow-to-nonexistent and
closed to foreigners. Governments often had to rely on risky borrowing abroad;
the private sector had even fewer options. But between 1995 and 2005, domestic
debt in the emerging markets grew from $1 trillion to $4 trillion dollars. In Mexico, domestic debt went from just over twenty percent of the total government
debt stock in 1995 to nearly eighty percent in 2007. Over the same period, derivative contracts to transfer emerging market credit risk surpassed the market capitalization of the benchmark bond index. The growth of domestic bonds and risk
transfer technology makes the emerging markets look more "mature," or mainstream. Yet a closer look at recent changes suggests that the popular rhetoric of
mainstreaming and convergence obscures more than it reveals. Emerging and
mainstream markets may share participants and use similar instruments, but this
formal resemblance rarely stands for substantive identity. Instead, investors use
the same instruments differently in different markets, which, as the examples in
the text suggest, can be its own source of risk. Legal scholarship has yet to engage
with the shift from foreign-law, foreign-currency to local-law, local-currency bonds
and the rise of credit derivatives in the emerging markets. This symposium essay
maps the ongoing transformation to highlight gaps between formal and substantive convergence of emerging and mainstream markets and suggest implications
for governance, risk management, and future research.
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Latin American contract documentation used to be quite short, as is typical in
civil law countries. Increasingly, it resembles U.S. contract documentation: long,
detailed, and full of boilerplate. This commentary discusses this development, and
considers what effect it will have on contracting practice in Latin America; it also
considers some broader implications of international convergence in contracting
practices.
I argue that the explanation can't be that U.S. contracting practices are superior. That explanation doesn't even work in the U.S., where parties and institutions are geared up to use U.S. practices and documentation. Indeed, most of the
virtues of U.S.-style contracting are unavailable when one or both parties are
Latin American. My alternative explanation principally relies on agency costs,
path dependence, and an arms-race. Once one party presents a U.S.-style contract,
the other party is hard pressed not to respond in kind; eventually, U.S.-style documentation becomes the norm.
And it's not just the documentation that may become the norm. The penumbra-constricting ethos, wherein a specific prohibition is deemed to permit anything
"up to the line" may be imported along with the U.S.-style documentation. But,
given increasing globalization, which brings with it increasing heterogeneity
among contracting parties, the adoption of U.S.-style documentation outside the
U.S. may be inevitable.
THE COLOR OF BRAZIL:
LAW, ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Tade 0. Okediji 185

The influence of ethnic fragmentation on economic performance has been the
subject of much scholarly inquiry in economics and political economics literature.
Studies have shown that ethnic fragmentation has a distinct impact on the prospects for economic growth through its effect on government policies and in particular macroeconomic stabilization strategies. It has also become relevant in legal

scholarship, especially with regard to developing antidiscrimination laws to ameliorate incessant conflict in plural societies. Accurate measurements of the scale or
degree of ethnic fragmentation are important for determining sustainable economic development policies and legal policies for overall development planning.
The multiple, complex, and often intractable variations of ethnic identity are
muted in existing measurements of ethnic fragmentation, including the prevailing
ELF Index. Using Brazil as a case study, this article illustrates how a newly-derived index of ethnic fragmentation called the Social Diversity Index (SDI) is
more robust and does a better job than the prevailing index in illustrating the
multiple dimensions of ethnic fragmentation. Further, the analysis explores the
link between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth in Brazil and examines
legal remedies designed to address racial inequality in Brazil.
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE ROLE OF LAW AND MARKETS AND THE
CASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Antonio Vives

199

In order for the corporation to engage in responsible practices, many obstacles must be overcome. One such obstacle is the belief of many managers that the
corporation would be violating its fiduciary responsibility if it engaged in activities
that go beyond what is required by the law. Another obstacle is that many of those
practices have a real cost but are perceived not to have a corresponding tangible
benefit. The article discusses and dismisses these perceived obstacles and argues
that it is both through law and the workings of the market that responsible behavior can enhance society's welfare. It is precisely the market that can induce the
corporation to go beyond the minimum requirements of the law, thereby avoiding
the need for constraining laws and regulation that would stifle creativity and innovation. In the case of developing countries, the situation is more critical; those
same two obstacles are at work, but laws and regulations are deficient and poorly
enforced and markets are even more imperfect. There is a strong need to develop
institutions and markets and to educate managers on the long-term benefits of
responsible behavior for society and, consequently, for the corporation itself
through its contribution to economic development.

ORDER WITHOUT (ENFORCEABLE) LAW:
WHY COUNTRIES ENTER INTO NON-ENFORCEABLE
COMPETITION POLICY CHAPTERS IN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

D. Daniel Sokol

There has been an explosion in the past ten to fifteen years of bilateral and
regional free trade agreements in Latin America (together, preferential free trade
agreements or PTAs). The purpose of PTAs is to increase trade, regulatory, and
investment liberalization. As trade liberalization requires more than just a reduction of tariffs, PTAs include "chapters" in a number of areas of domestic regulation. These chapters that address domestic regulation create binding commitments
to liberalize domestic regulation that may impact foreign trade. Among chapters
that address domestic regulation, many of the Latin American PTAs include a
chapter on antitrust or competition policy. Until now, the effectiveness of such
chapters has remained undefined. This article undertakes the first empirical analysis of Latin American antitrust or competition policy chapters in PTAs.
To understand the dynamics of PTAs, this article begins with some context of
Latin American development. First, the article provides an overview of the process of liberalization in Latin America. It then describes how domestic antitrust
fits within Latin American liberalization. The article describes competition policy
chapters within Latin American PTAs based on the results of coding these provisions. The standard practice in PTAs is to create binding commitments that have
third-party adjudication for potential disputes. The choice of binding international
institutions, such as PTAs, is based on the perception of the relative strength of
PTAs over purely domestic approaches. A comparison of the institutional alternatives to PTAs illustrates that this perception is not born out by the facts. This
article finds that antitrust chapters within PTAs go against the standard practice of

231

binding commitments. Competition policy chapters, unlike other chapters of the
same trade agreement, lack binding dispute settlement. All Latin American PTAs
lack dispute settlement for core antitrust issues of mergers, collusive agreements,
and monopolization within the competition policy chapters. This departure from
the standard PTA practice is more striking given that other chapters in the same
trade agreement have binding dispute resolution. These other chapters include
some competition element to them, such as services and intellectual property. The
remainder of the paper explores the dynamics of these chapters, including why
PTAs treat antitrust differently from other areas of domestic regulation.
THE FUTURE OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW IN LATIN AMERICA:
FOR MODEL CODES

A
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Juan Javier del Granado 293
and M.C. Mirow

Nothing excites civilian lawyers and judges more than commissions for codification. Codification is more than an academic enterprise. Codification projects
directly cut across the interface between law and life. ALACDE intends to harness
this Latin American interest in codification to bring the economic approach to
Latin America. A new-generation law and economics civil and commercial code
will be a conscious project to restate Roman law's usefulness for coping with today's problems. Through law and economics, Roman law will renew itself. As a
paradigmatic private-law system, Roman law is eminently amenable to a state-ofthe-art fusion with law and economics. Sensitivity to what drives a particular legal
culture is vital to a project meant for generating interest in law and economics
among a new generation of Latin American lawyers and judges. We feel that the
economic approach to law can only have an impact within the legal and social
environment of Latin American countries if law and economics adapts to Latin
America. Our suggested adaptation is the use of codification.
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WHAT IS THE POINT OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE?

Mirjan Damagka 329

The first part of the article discusses the goals international criminal courts
have set for themselves. The author believes that these goals are too numerous,
that they are often in conflict, and that the courts are not well suited for the
achievement of some of them. This situation generates disparity between the
courts' aspiration and achievement, a degree of disorientation, and difficulty in
assessing the courts' performance. Disillusionment stemming from unfulfilled expectations, and inconsistencies springing from disorientation, are harmful to any
system of justice, and especially to international criminal courts whose legitimacy
is still fragile.
In the second part of the article, the author explores ways in which this particular weakness of international criminal justice could be overcome, or at least alleviated. Two main avenues of improvement are recommended. Some proclaimed
objectives, the author maintains, should be abandoned or played down, and a goal
should be selected as over-arching so that tension among the remaining objectives
can be better managed. Having proposed that a didactic function be accorded
pride of place, the author then examines several salient problems that this particular choice would entail.
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UNDER GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS

Sarah F. Suma
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Resolving a circuit split, the Supreme Court declared in Garcetti v. Ceballos
that the First Amendment does not protect speech made pursuant to a public employee's work duties, regardless of whether the speech relates to a matter of public
concern or the government's restrictions are justifiable. This article argues that a
bright line rule eliminating First Amendment protection for job-duty speech is
inconsistent with the theories underlying free speech protection. Further, this article explores practical drawbacks to Garcetti's bright-line rule, including inconsistent judicial determination of the scope of job duties, a disincentive to report
government abuse through one's chain-of-command, and a lack of protection for
those who are best informed about the subject of their speech and who are under
professional or legal obligations to speak.
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APPLICATION OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Christine M. Zeivel
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In United States v. Booker, a dramatic decision handed down in early 2005,
the Supreme Court attempted to cure Sixth Amendment issues by excising the
mandatory provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and changing the binding
role of the Guidelines to advisory. For close to twenty years, federal circuit courts
had used the Ex Post Facto Clause to prohibit sentencing judges from retroactively
applying revisions of the federal Guidelines. However, after Booker's advisory
mandate and the Guidelines' supposed loss of force in sentencing decisions, some
circuits have now found that the same retroactive application no longer violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause. This article argues that, despite these early-occurring
precedents, courts need to continue applying the Ex Post Facto Clause to the revisions of the now-advisory Guidelines. Applying the Guideline revisions to defendants who committed their crimes prior to the date the revisions become effective is
still retroactive and substantially disadvantages such defendants. Moreover, the
national trend since Booker indicates that the Guidelines continue to have the
force and effect of law, create high hurdles for judicial discretion, and directly and
adversely affect the sentence a defendant receives.

To DISCLOSE OR NOT TO DISCLOSE:
DUTY OF CANDOR OBLIGATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN
PATENT OFFICES

Gina M. Bicknell

Many patent offices around the world have rigorous prior art disclosure requirements. U.S. patent applicants not only must meet each individual country's
criteria for disclosure, but also must contend with allegations of inequitable conduct from patent infringers which may render their patents unenforceable. This
article argues that the new prior art disclosure rules promulgated by the USPTO
unfairly shift the burden of examining patent applications onto patent applicants,
and create a situation ripe for allegations of inequitable conduct. This article also
examines how other countries handle disclosure obligations, and recommends several alternative systems that would meet the USPTO's objectives of increasing
quality and efficiency while relieving the "plague" of inequitable conduct cases.
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